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ABSTRACT
This study assesses the relationships among industrial
relations system characteristics, quality of working life improvement
efforts, and selected measures of organizational effectiveness in
twenty-five manufacturing plants between 1970 and 1980. Theoretical
propositions are developed by integrating research on organizational
behavior, industrial relations, and micro-economics. Thereby, the
importance of linking concepts and analytical techniques from these
fields is illustrated. The paper also emphasizes the need for
professionals within organizations to develop better data systems in
order to track the effects of experiments in organizational change on
industrial relations performance and organizational effectiveness.
The empirical results show strong connections between measures of
industrial relations system performance and organizational
effectiveness and more limited support for the hypothesis that
quality of working life efforts improve organizational effectiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
The slowdown in productivity growth and sluggish macro economic
performance in recent years has drawn increasing attention to the
U.S. system of industrial relations and various strategies for
improving its performance. This is leading to a new era of
experimentation at the organizational level with various worker
participation programs, new local collective bargaining agreements,
and changes in other employment practices that are designed to both
improve industrial relations and organizational effectiveness. These
pressures are also producing a new emphasis within management on
applying strategic planning techniques to the industrial relations
function as firms and unions begin to recognize the interdependence
among broad business policy decisions and industrial relations
performance at the workplace level. Consequently, industrial
relations professionals within both management and unions are being
called upon to critically examine their prevailing practices and to
assess alternative strategies that satisfy organizational and worker
goals.
Unfortunately, the industrial relations profession has been
slow in developing the type of analytical capacity required to
support these experimentation, planning, and evaluation processes.
Instead, there historically has been an aversion among many
industrial relations managers and labor representatives to the idea
of quantitative assessment of industrial relations practices and
performance. Few firms, for example, systematically collect and
analyze industrial relations activity or performance data. Even
fewer attempt to relate variations in industrial relations outcomes
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over time or across locations to indicators of organizational
effectiveness or worker well being. Indeed, aside from the analysis
of the effects of unions on wages and other job and organizational
outcomes (Freeman and Medoff, 1981; Kochan and Helfman, 1981), we
have little theoretical or empirical work that attempts to relate
industrial relations outcomes to management and worker goals. Thus,
industrial relations professionals are currently in a poor position
to forecast or explain how various change strategies might influence
organizational effectiveness and, perhaps more importantly, are
poorly equipped to evaluate the effects of these change efforts.
These developments in organizational and industrial relations
practices are emerging after a decade in which a wide range of
researchers have been arguing for a closer link between industrial
relations and organizational behavior theory, research and practice
(Fox, 1971; 1974; Goodman, 1979; Brett, 1980; Kochan, 1980; Bomers
and Peterson, 1982; IDE, 1981; Stephenson and Brotherton, 1979;
Thomson and Warner, 1981). Two central themes are embedded in much
of this literature. The first argues that industrial relations
issues offer an ideal laboratory for testing organizational theories
of workplace behavior and performance. The second theme counters
with an important caveat, namely, that any organizational theories
that ignore industrial relations institutions and practices are
likely to have poor explanatory or predictive power and even less
organizational relevance. Recently, micro economists have joined in
the analysis of the intersection of industrial relations and
organizational behavior as they search for ways to understand the
interactions among market forces, institutional structures, and the
behavior of individuals and firms (Leibenstein, 1966; Hirshman, 1970;
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Pencavel, 1979; Williamson, 1975; Freeman and Medoff, 1981; Kochan
and Helfman, 1981).
This paper attempts to illustrate and apply the themes noted
above by exploring an issue that lies right at the heart of the
intersection of organizational behavior, industrial relations, and
micro economics. We will examine the effects of industrial relations
system outcomes on selected measures of organizational performance as
well as the effects of intervention strategies designed to improve
performance by, in part, improving the performance of the workplace
industrial relations system.
This is also the second in a series of papers designed to
demonstrate the value of more systematic analysis of industrial
relations data at the plant level. The initial paper was an
exploratory effort that analyzed the relationships between plant
level industrial relations performance, economic performance, and
quality of working life (QWL) efforts (Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille, in
press). This paper builds on the previous work by drawing on a
broader set of data from a different set of plants. An improved set
of measures of the QWL efforts active in these plants allows us to
more effectively evaluate the effects of these on-going efforts than
was possible in the earlier study. Thus, in addition to replicating
the initial results of the previous paper, we can demonstrate more
clearly both the value and complexities involved in assessing the
effects of QWL interventions in the industrial relations system.
Furthermore, because the initial paper was exploratory in nature, we
emphasized the empirical results, and only after the analysis was
completed, did we suggest a set of theoretical explanations for why
and how QWL efforts might affect industrial relations and economic
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performance. This paper allows us to more fully develop and test
these propositions.
The Theoretical Framework
The central questions to be addressed by a theoretical
framework that assesses the effects of industrial relations on the
goals of the firm and workers are: (1) what are the critical
dimensions of plant level industrial relations performance, (2) how
do these influence worker and organizational goals, and (3) how do
improvement strategies influence these industrial relations,
organizational, and individual outcomes.
The general model guiding our analysis of these issues is
outlined in Figure 1. The industrial relations system and its
performance at the plant level are seen as being influenced by a
variety of external environment, demographic, organization, and
historical factors. While this stage of the model is important in
its own right, it is not the focus of this paper. For the purposes
of this paper we are less interested in the historical and
environmental causes of variation in the properties of the industrial
relations system than in identifying the effects of variations in
these properties on organizational effectiveness and worker goals.
The performance of the industrial relations system is expected to
influence organizational performance primarily through its effects on
labor efficiency, productivity, and product quality. QWL efforts and
related interventions are seen as strategies for changing the work
organization and relationships among workers, supervisors, managers,
and union leaders so as to produce improvements in the industrial
relations system and its outcomes (Goodman, 1979).
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It is recognized, however, that not all of the goals of the
firm and workers are common or compatible. Rather the employment
relationship is mixed motive in nature -- some goals are shared, and
through improved problem solving, integrative (join gain) solutions
can be identified while other goals are inherently distributive and
require bargaining or tradeoff decisions (Walton and McKersie,
1965). QWL efforts represent a search for joint gains within this
mixed motive relationship. Thus, as we develop the framework in more
detail below, we need to recognize that plant level QWL efforts are
only part of the industrial relations system and to survive over time
must coexist with distributive bargaining within the larger mixed
motive employment relationship.
The Industrial Relations System and its Performance
While the popular accounts of the industrial relations system
found in American plants admonish it for being too "adversarial,"
this term is seldom clearly defined. Indeed, the dimensions of the
industrial relations system and its performance at the plant level
are not well specified in the theoretical or empirical literature.
In the previous paper (Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille, in press) we
suggested that the industrial relations system at the plant level
influenced economic performance through three interrelated routes:
(1) the effectiveness of the management of conflict in the
union-management relationship, (2) the motivation, commitment, and
behavior of individual workers and work groups, and (3) the rules and
practices governing the allocation and use of human resources. These
emerged as tentative hypotheses for explaining the empirical
relationships observed between measures of industrial relations
performance (grievance rates, discipline rates, absenteeism, and
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labor-management climate) and economic performance (product quality
and labor efficiency). In this section we spell out more fully the
links expected between these aspects of plant level industrial
relations and organizational effectiveness.
Conflict Resolution Systems. One critical function of an
industrial relations system is to establish procedures and processes
for addressing and resolving conflicts or problems that arise between
employees and management. In the U.S., unions and employers rely
heavily on formal contract negotiations and grievance procedures for
this purpose. We propose that the effectiveness of these formal
negotiation and conflict resolution mechanisms are directly related
to organizational effectiveness for at least three reasons.
First, because these are formal representative procedures they
require a considerable amount of time, people, and resources to
manage. Thus, the sheer volume of grievances and bargaining demands
that arise in a plant will have an effect on the costs of managing a
plant. To the extent that management and union resources (time and
people) are devoted to managing these formal adversarial procedures,
fewer resources are available for training, problem solving,
communications and other productivity, human resource management, or
organizational development activities. This might be described as
the displacement effect (Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille, in press).
Second, the volume of grievances and bargaining demands can be
sympotmatic of the success or failure of the parties to resolve
differences on a more informal basis or at early steps of the formal
procedures. Thus, the number of grievances or bargaining demands,
and the inability of the parties to settle issues without frequent
threatened or actual work stoppages most likely signal deeper seated
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problems in the conflict resolution/problem solving systems in the
plant. Thus we would expect that plant level measures of grievance
rates, the number of bargaining demands, the length of negotiations,
strike threats and strike occurrence should be systematically related
to other measures of industrial relations performance. A good deal
of previous research on the determinants of grievance rates is
consistent with this argument (Peach and Livernash, 1974; Thomson and
Murray, 1976; Knight, 1978; Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille, in press).
Third, because the formal grievance and bargaining processes
focus on distributive issues, they inherently entail some degree of
political and tactical posturing, gamesmanship, bluffing, and
commitment building tactics (Waltcn and McKersie, 1965; Schelling,
1960). To the extent that these political or distributive bargaining
tactics escalate, get perpetuated over time, and spread across the
entire range of issues that the parties deal with, a high
conflict/low trust syndrome (Fox, 1974) or what Boulding (1962)
described as a "conflict trap" can set in. That is, the distributive
or inherently conflictful patterns may drive out the potential for
integrative bargaining or cooperation even on those issues over which
the parties share common interests. The belief that this is a common
feature of current American industrial relations is what gives rise
to the criticism that our system is "too adversarial" (Barbash, 1980).
For these three reasons, we hypothesize that indicators of
greater conflict between labor and management at the shop floor level
will be associated with lower efficiency, poorer quality and
generally, poorer plant level organizational performance. Secondly,
we hypothesize that there will exist strong interrelationships
between the various indicators of plant level industrial relations
performance.
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It should be noted that we are not implying here that these
conflict resolution systems do not serve important and useful
functions for labor and management. They are natural and necessary
procedures that have endured the test of time for resolving conflicts
that are bound to arise in any employment relationship and for
protecting the individual rights of employees. It is not their
existence per se but their poor performance that is expected to lead
to lower levels of organizational effectiveness.
Worker Motivation/Commitment/Involvement/Performance. While
the conflict resolution system reflects the broad institutional
features of an industrial relations system, it is clear that the
motivation, attitudes, and behavior of individuals and informal work
groups can exert an independent effect on organizational performance
as well. Yet, there has been a longstanding (Brayfield and Crockett,
1955; Herzberg, et al., 1959; Schwab and Cummings, 1970) and to date
unresolved (Dyer and Schwab, 1982) debate on the direction and
strength of the causal relationships between these individual
attitudinal and behavioral characteristics, and organizational
performance. On the one hand, there is abundant evidence to suggest
that there is no consistent or simple causal relationship between
individual worker satisfaction and individual worker performance
(Schwab and Cummings, 1970). On the other hand, a wide range of
theoretical arguments suggest that individual worker ability,
motivation, and participation in job related decision-making will
affect both organizational effectiveness and individual worker
satisfaction (Hackman and Oldham, 1976; Goodman, 1979; Walton, 1980;
Lawler and Ledford, 1981-82; Mowday, Porter, and Steers, 1982). To
the extent that workers have the ability and willingness to make
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suggestions and to participate in the search for ways to improve job
performance, and to the extent these efforts can be maintained over
time, high levels of individual worker motivation/commitment/
participation shoul lead to improved organizational effectiveness
and worker satisfaction.
These potentially positive links between individual attitudes
and behavior and organizational effectiveness can only be maintained
over time if the larger economic and institutional environment
maintains support for high levels of individual involvement and labor
management cooperation (Walton, 1980; Kochan and Dyer, 1976). Unless
the larger union-management relationship and management systems
remain supportive and workers experience tangible rewards from their
involvement, high levels of commitment are likely to either gradually
atrophy (Walton, 1975) or end abruptly in response to some visible
conflict (Goodman, 1979).
Another aspect of individual behavior that is expected to be
related to other industrial relations outcomes is the absenteeism
rate in the plant. While the evidence on the strength of the
relationship between job satisfaction and the frequency that an
individual worker is absent is mixed (Dyer and Schwab, 1982), it has
been argued that voluntary absenteeism should be related to employee
motivation (Steers and Rhodes, 1978). Others have suggested that the
relationships between the aggregate plant-wide rate of absenteeism
and worker attitudes, commitment and other aspects of industrial
relations should be stronger than the relationship between individual
worker attitudes and absenteeism (Nicholson, Brown, and
Chadwick-Jones, 1976). In any event, the costs imposed by high rates
of absenteeism should exert an independent effect on organizational
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performance (Hackman and Lawler, 1971) regardless of the relationship
between absenteeism and other industrial relations outcomes.
We therefore expect our measures of employee participation in
suggestion programs, attitudes, and absentee rates to be related to
other industrial relations performance measures and to measures of
organizational performance.
Human Resource Management Rules and 'Practices. The substantive
rules and practices governing the organization of work, the
allocation of workers, the compensation system, and the adaptability
to change serve as a third important channel through which the
industrial relations system of a plant will influence organizational
effectiveness and employee goals. Work rules and their
administration and modification historically have been recognized as
important factors influencing labor costs and productivity (Slichter,
1941; Slichter, Healy, and Livernash, 1960; Hartman, 1973; McKersie
and Hunter, 1973). These rules and practices develop over time both
explicitly through collective bargaining agreement provisions and
informally (Roy, 1952; Dalton, 1959; Kuhn, 1961; Sayles, 1958;
McKersie and Klein, 1982) in both union and non-union situations.
Rules are necessary to bring about stability and equity in work
practices and to protect the rights and responsibilities of both
workers and their employers. Over time, however, work practices and
rules can accumulate, and become outmoded because of technological or
other changes in the plant or the product. Yet, they also become
difficult to change since change often threatens worker job security
by affecting the jurisdiction of work, seniority and transfer rights,
the number of workers required to perform the given volume of work,
etc. Thus, work practices discussions are inherently mixed motive in
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nature--all parties share an interest in eliminating wasteful work
practices that add to costs, yet changes in practices may require
changes which threaten the job security or alter the promotion
prospects of individual workers. Thus, the flexibility with which
the industrial relations system manages work rules and work practices
at the plant level will influence organizational effectiveness and
worker objectives.
As with the bargaining process and grievance procedures,
establishing policies and rules governing the organization and
distribution of work opportunities is a necessary and essential
function of the industrial relations system (Dunlop, 1958). Yet the
buildup of rules and the inability to modify work practices can
reduce organizational effectiveness. Thus, again it is the ability
of the parties to manage and adjust work practices to meet the
productivity needs of the firm and the interests of the workforce
that is critical, and it is not the presence of rules per se that
influences organizational effectiveness.
In summary then, we are proposing that the degree of conflict
resolution, individual worker attitudes and behavior, and the
flexibility within substantive work rules are three key dimensions
of an industrial relations system that will have important effects on
organizational effectiveness. Over time these dimensions become
interrelated in a reinforcing cycle. Worker dissatisfaction or lack
of trust may lead to higher levels of grievances and bargaining
demands, and to a more adversarial relationship between workers and
management. Inability to effectively resolve conflicts is, in turn,
likely to lead to greater emphasis on legalistic rules and strict
enforcement of contract terms and the further build-up of work rules
-11-
that one or both of the parties will resist changing. The high
conflict/low trust cycle will then spill over to reinforce
supervisors' beliefs in the need for rigid/authoritarian styles of
supervision, and employee motivation, job performance and commitment
to the organization will decline.
QWL efforts represent strategies for breaking into the cycle of
events described above in order to initiate changes that will reverse
the high conflict/low trust pattern and support individual employee
participation and involvement. To the extent these efforts are
successful in increasing trust, employee involvement, and problem
solving in the short run, they can be expected to lead to short run
improvements in both worker satisfaction and organizational
effectiveness. Improved trust and problem solving and a more.
participative managerial style may also lead to lower grievance rates
or settlements at lower levels of the grievance procedure. At an
advanced stage, QWL efforts may also lead to more flexibility in work
rules. To the extent that these QWL efforts can coexist with the
on-going distributive aspects of the bargaining relationship and
survive political and economic pressures that challenge these efforts
over time, they can be expected to help organizations maintain higher
levels of organizational effectiveness.
The above discussion provides the theoretical framework that we
believe should guide the collection and analysis of data designed to
assess the effects of an industrial relations system on
organizational effectiveness and worker goals, and to track and
evaluate the effects of QWL or other intervention strategies.
Because of the importance we attach to the effects of the larger
contexts (economic environment, distributive bargaining,
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organizational policies, union-management climate, etc.) a
longitudinal research design that is sensitive to the cycle of
activities that occur in a normal bargaining relationship is critical
to an evaluation framework. Short run improvements in worker
attitudes, motivation, grievance rates, and even measures of economic
performance are necessary but not sufficient tests of the effects of
QWL efforts. The more telling test is whether the short run positive
effects can be maintained through a complete cycle of contract
negotiations, the negotiation of changes in local work rules,
turnover of key management or union decision-makers, and in an even
broader sense, the engagement of management and union officials in
major bargains over strategic issues such as the organization of new
plants or the reinvestment of resources in existing plants.
We obviously cannot build all of these tests into the empirical
analysis to follow, nor would we expect any single study in the
future to do so. These comprehensive design criteria are spelled out
here to put our own work and future work in perspective. We are able
to present the results of a longitudinal study that takes advantage
of a rich data set collected as part of the information system of a
major company. We thereby illustrate the value of this type of
internal data collection and analytical capability.
Data and Analysis Plan
The data for this study were collected from a large durable
goods manufacturer in the United States. The data are plant level
observations covering the years 1970-80 from the company's
twenty-five manufacturing facilities which employ roughly 50,000
persons and have annual sales in excess of one billion dollars. The
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technology and product in all of the plants are very similar. All
the hourly workers in these plants belong to the same industrial
union.
The overall data set provides a pooled cross-section sample of
275 observations for most of the industrial relations and economic
performance measures. Missing data reduce this sample in some of the
analyses.
Industrial Relations Performance Measures
The industrial relations performance measures included in the
analysis and their respective variable names are:
1. The number of grievances filed per 100 workers (Grievance)
2. The number of disciplinary actions per 100 workers, actions
which involve a suspension or some more severe penalty.
(Discipline)
3. The number of demands submitted by the union in tri-
annual local contract negotiations. These local agree-
ments are supplemental to the company-wide contract.
(Demands)
4. The number of days it took to reach a settlement in local
contract negotiations before or after settlement of the
company's master agreement. Four rounds of bargaining
occurred in our sample (1970, 1973, 1976 and 1979) thus
the maximum sample size for data relating to the
negotiating process is 100. (Negtime)
5. The number of strike intent letters issued by the union.
Under the provisions of the company-wide contract only
disputes that concern production standards legally can
lead to local strikes. Other local disputes are resolved
through the grievance procedure that includes arbitration
as its final step. In practice, these strike letters often
involve issues other than production standards and serve
notice to the company that tensions are high between labor
and management in the plant. (Strikelet)
6. The number of authorized or unauthorized local strikes.
(Totstrike)
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7. A survey asked salaried employees including first line
supervisors a number of questions regarding compensation and
benefit levels, working environment, relationships with
supervisors and subordinates, and career progress. Low
score responses indicated dissatisfaction. A summary score
was derived from these surveys for each plant. The variable
we utilize is the percentage of respondents in each plant
that had an overall survey score greater than 3.2 on a 1 to
5 scale. Survey data are available for the years 1977 to
1980. (Attitude)
8. The number of suggestions submitted per employee in the
company's suggestion program. (Sugperemp)
9. The percentage of employees that submitted at least one
suggestion during the year. The suggestion program data
are available from 1976 to 1980. (Sugpct)
10. The absentee rate as a percentage of straight time hours,
excluding contractual days off. (Absentee)
The first six of these variables all capture aspects of the
formal conflict resolution systems in these organizations. The last
four measure aspects of individual attitudes and behaviors that are
expected to influence organization effectiveness. Unfortunately, no
measures of plant work rules or practices are available for this
study.
Economic Performance Measures
The organizational effectiveness measures available for this
study primarily capture a number of key dimensions of the economic
performance of each plant. Therefore, from here on we will refer to
these as economic performance measures while recognizing that
although economic performance is most likely the most important
dimension of organization effectiveness, it is not necessarily
synomonous with this broader construct.
Economic performance of each plant is measured with variables
that measure the costs of workers' compensation, accidents and
illnesses, the number of illnesses and accidents, and with measures
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of the direct labor efficiency and product quality in each plant.
These measures are treated separately because, although the presence
of higher accident or illness rates in a plant may indirectly affect
direct labor efficiency and product quality, these rates are not
incorporated in the specific direct labor or quality variables we
employ. A detailed description of these variables follows.
1. The cost of sickness or accident (non-work related) benefits
provided for in the company collective bargaining
agreement. The dollar payments are expressed on a per
employee basis and are adjusted by a price deflator which
captures the effects of the escalating cost of these
benefits. (SAcost)
2. The number of injuries requiring more than minor first aid
per 200,000 hours worked. Accident rate figures are
available from 1975 to 1980. (SArate)
3. The number of accidents producing an injury which prevented
an employee from performing his or her normal job deflated
by the total hours worked. (SAtime)
4. The company costs of worker compensation payments to
employees, ex-employees or surviving spouses for work
related injuries under state workers compensation programs.
These costs are deflated by a price index and an index of
average state indemnity costs to account for inter-state
variations in legal coverage. (WCcost)
5. A quality index derived from a count of the number of faults
and "demerits" that appear in inspections of the product. A
higher quality score is associated with better product
quality. This index is available for 1975-80. (Quality)
6. A direct labor efficiency index which compares the actual
hours of direct labor input to standardized hours calculated
by the company's industrial engineers. The labor standards
utilized in this index are adjusted for product attributes.
A higher direct labor index is associated with higher
efficiency and lower costs. (Direct)
QWL Program Measures
With the cooperation of the union representing its workforce, this
company began to implement QWL programs in its plants in 1973. From 1973
to 1980, the actual development of QWL programs among salaried and hourly
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employees varied widely across the plants. The extent of QWL development
is measured by the percentages of salaried (QWLInvsa) and hourly
(QWLInvhr) employees involved in some form of QWL program in each plant.
These figures are estimates provided by the personnel director in each
plant.
The analysis starts with a description of the variations in
industrial relations and economic performance across the plants. We then
review the correlations that exist among the various industrial relations
performance measures and the correlations that exist between the
industrial relations and economic performance measures. Then we assess
the diffusion and impacts of involvement in QWL programs.
Results
The descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 illustrate the
importance of examining the diversity of outcomes that are produced by
collective bargaining in different bargaining relationships. Despite the
common technology, union, and employer from which these data are drawn,
there is a wide variation across plants in grievance rates, discipline
rates, absenteeism, and other industrial relations and economic
performance measures. Note, for example, that in 1980 grievances per one
hundred workers varied from a low of 5 in one plant to a high of 121 in
another plant. Absenteeism varied between 4.6% and 8.8%. The number of
contract demands introduced in the local negotiations for the 1979
agreement varied from a low of 66 to a high of 690. Direct labor
efficiency varied from 20.4% above standard to 23.7% below standard.
The measures of worker participation in suggestion programs, salaried
employee attitudes, and involvement in QWL programs also reveal wide
-17-
______1___1____________ I _ __ ___
variation across plants. In 1980, the number of suggestions per employee
ranges from .13 to 1.04, and the percent of salaried employees with high
QWL attitudes is 40% in one plant to 74% in another. The percentage of
salaried employees involved in some form of QWL program varies from 0 to
100%, while the percentage of hourly employees involved in QWL programs
ranges from 0 to 74%. The wide variation in QWL program involvement
across the company suggests some of the difficulties involved in
introducing these programs. As well, the fact that QWL involvement
varies significantly across the plants assists our efforts to identify
the independent impact of QWL programs on industrial relations and
economic performance. Before turning to the evaluation of QWL, we
analyze the interactions between the measures listed in Table 1.
Relationships Among Industrial Relations Performance Measures
The correlations among the measures of industrial relations
performance across plants and years are presented in Table 2. The table
reveals a high degree of inter-correlation among the various measures of
industrial relations performance thus supporting our hypothesis regarding
the inter-connected nature of the industrial relations system. For
instance, the data show a strong correlation between the various
indicators of the level of conflict within the plants. The higher the
grievance rate in a plant the higher the discipline rate (r=.34), the
more demands introduced into local negotiations (r=.22), the longer the
negotiating time required to reach an agreement (r=.38), the more strike
letters issued (r=.25), and the more frequent are local strikes (r=.02).
Except for the correlation with strike number, all of these correlations
are statistically significant at the 1% level.l
The data also reveal a strong connection between indicators of the
level of conflict and measures of employee attitudes and participation.
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Better attitudes among salaried personnel are associated with lower
grievance rates (r = -.47), lower discipline rates (r = -.25), fewer
contract demands (r = -.22), fewer strike letters (r = -.29) and fewer
strikes (r = -.06). Again, except for striko occurence these
correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. The
connection between individual behavior and the level of conflict also is
revealed in the associations that absentee rates and employee
participation in suggestion programs have with grievance rates,
discipline rates, the number of demands, egotiation time, and the
issuance of strike letters. These nterelationshios are consistent in
both direction and magnitude with our analyss of a similar data set (see
Katz, Kochan and Gobeille, in press).
Relationships Between Industrial Relations and Economic Performance
Correlations between measures of economic performance and a number of
the industrial relations performance measures are presented in Table 3.
These correlations provide strong supoorting evidence for our hypothesis
that the level of conflict and individual behavior can affect
organizational effectiveness.
A number of the indicators of plant level conflict intensity are
strongly associated with the economic performance indicators. For
example, higher grievance rates are associated in a statistically
significant manner with lower direct labor efficiency (r = -.41), pcorer
product quality (r = -.30), and more injuries (r=.23). The issuance of
more strike letters in a plant is associated with lower direct labor
efficiency (r = -.18), poorer product quality (r = -.26), higher sickness
and accident costs (r=.02), more injuries (r=.10), and more accidents
(r=.23). Three of these five correlations are statistically significant
at the 1% level.
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A connection between individual behavior and economic performance is
revealed in a number of the correlations. More positive salaried
employee attitudes are associated with higher direct labor efficiency
(r=.40), better product quality (r=.48), lower sickness and accident
costs (r = -.30), fewer injuries (r = -.38) fewer accidents (r = -.41),
and lower workers' compensation costs (r = -.03). Except for the latter,
all of these correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Supporting evidence also comes from the positive association between the
number of suggestions offered per employee and higher direct labor
efficiency (r=.21), better product quality (r=.53), lower sickness and
accident costs (r = -.14), fewer injuries (r = -.23), fewer accidents
(r = -.20), and lower workers' compensation costs (r = -.16). Five out
of these six correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level.
As well as supporting our hypotheses, evidence of a connection
between plant level industrial relations and economic performance lends
further strength to our argument that the systematic collection of this
type of data has great value for organizations. These data provide a way
to both assess current performance and identify problem areas.
QWL Evaluation
As mentioned earlier, the company under study, with the cooperation
of the union, initiated an effort to diffuse QWL programs throughout its
plants in 1973. In this section, we assess the extent to which QWL
programs diffused across the plants and evaluate their impacts on
industrial relations and economic performance.
The first task is to assess the extent to which QWL programs were
underway within the various plants after 1973. We utilize the
percentages of the salaried and hourly workforces involved in some form
of QWL program in each year as a measure of the QWL diffusion. Figure 2
-20-
III
reports these data for the company as a whole for 1973 to 1980. As
Figure 2 shows, salaried employees QWL involvement rose dramatically in
1976. At that point in time corporate officials had initiated a new
campaign to encourage plant level personnel staff to expand their QWL
programs. Elsewhere, Mower (1982) discusses the important role played by
QWL involvement among salaried employees in the diffusion of QWL programs
among hourly workers. Evidence of that role is provided by the fact that
hourly QWL involvement, after growing only modestly between 1973 and
1978, shot upward in 1979, three years after the dramatic rise in
salaried employee QWL involvement.
It is also interesting to note that the upturn in hourly QWL
involvement coincides with a sharp deterioration in this company's
economic situation.2 This economic downturn led to a large number of
layoffs in the company and significant new concern regarding the
company's production costs relative to its international competitors.
This is consistent with the argument of Katz (1982) that cost pressure
can strongly contribute to the growth of QWL programs.
Roughly 90% of the total company-wide hourly employee involvement in
QWL prior to 1978 came from one plant (this plant is discussed in more
detail later). As of 1980, after the upward turn of hourly QWL
involvement, most of which occurred in 1979, there were six plants that
had at least 33% of their hourly employees involved in some form of QWL
program. In 1980, nine plants had no QWL hourly involvement and the
remaining plants had very few hourly workers involved.
Observations of an individual plant's history of economic and
industrial relations performance, along with knowledge of when a QWL
program got underway in that plant, is one way to analyze the impacts of
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QWL programs. Longitudinal analysis also provides a way to observe the
staying power of QWL impacts, another issue of critical importance.
Figures 3 through 6 provide longitudinal plots for two plants in our
sample. These figures compare measures of the plant's economic and
industrial relations performance to the company-wide mean level of these
measures. Underneath the horizontal axis the percentage of hourly
workers involved in QWL in the respective plant is plotted. These graphs
then allow us to see if the performance of a particular plant has
improved relative to the rest of the company after a QWL program has
developed in that plant.
These figures and similar ones for other plants and variables
consistently show relative improvements in plant level performance after
increases in the level of QWL involvement. For example, as Figure 3
shows, plant 23's direct labor efficiency was lower than the company mean
in 1973 and 1974, but coincident with extensive growth in QWL hourly
involvement, the plant's direct labor efficiency rose dramatically
relative to the rest of the company. The grievance rate in plant 23
plotted in Figure 4 also shows relative improvement, particularly in 1973
and 1974 when the QWL program was getting underway in this plant.
Plant 8 in Figure 5 also shows a dramatic relative improvement in its
direct labor efficiency when QWL involvement increased among its hourly
workforce in 1979 and 1980. The same is true of plant 8's grievance rate
plotted in Figure 6.
Plant 23 is an interesting case because it provides an example (the
only one in this company) of a plant that had an increase followed by a
substantial decrease in QWL involvement during the 1973 to 1980 period.
As Figure 3 shows, when that decline occurred in 1979 and 1980, the
direct labor efficiency of plant 23 deteriorated relative to company mean
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figures (this is also true for plant 23's absentee rate). Plant 23
suggests that improvements achieved through QWL programs may well be
reversible.
One would not want to make too much out of the experiences of one
plant, however, plant 23 reinforces our claim that the diffusion of QWL
will not put an end to the "adversarial" relationship that exists between
labor and management. Furthermore, this reinforces our view that it is
of critical importance to assess the ability of QWL programs to survive
the challenges of difficult negotiations. This particular company, like
many other American manufacturers, currently faces severe economic
pressure. An essential task for future research is to assess how well
the QWL programs that are underway fare in the midst of this difficult
economic period.
A weakness of these longitudinal plant plots is that they do not
provide a measure of the overall impacts of the QWL programs. QWL
impacts in any particular plant may not be representative of the
experience in other plants. Secondly, these plots do not control for the
influence of other things that are occurring in the plant which may be
affecting the outcome variable. For instance, a change in direct labor
efficiency or absentee rates could be due to the effects of reductions in
output in the plant which happen to be occurring contemporaneously with
the growth in the plant's QWL program.3
To generate a broader assessment of the impact of hourly QWL
involvement we utilize the 33% hourly QWL involvement figure as a cutoff
point and compare the industrial relations and economic performance of
the six plants that had at least 33% hourly QWL involvement to the other
plants. In this comparison we focus on the percentage changes in
grievance and absentee rates, direct labor efficiency, and product
-23-
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quality in the three years before and after 1977. 1977 is chosen as a
point of comparison because this is when hourly QWL involvement began to
expand in the six plants. Table 4 summarizes this comparison.
From 1977 to 1980, the industrial relations and economic performance
of the six plants that had high QWL hourly involvement did not differ
consistently from the performance of the rest of the company.4 We draw
from this comparison no evidence that QWL led to relative improvements in
the plants that had high levels of hourly employee QWL involvement.
These comparisons of high QWL plants with the rest of the company provide
a more comprehensive assessment of QWL impacts. However, they do not
control for the influence of other factors that are varying across the
plants which may be affecting economic performance. Furthermore, group
comparisons do not pinpoint the moment when a QWL program actually
expands in a particular plant. The regression analysis reported below
accounts for these factors.
In these regressions we try to identify the independent impact of QWL
involvement on economic performance by controlling for the influence of
other factors. To do so, pooled time series-cross section regressions
are estimated with direct labor efficiency and quality as the dependent
variaOle, with QWL hourly involvement as an independent variable, and
with the share of overtime hours and plant size entered as control
variables. In a related study (Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille, in press) we
noted the important effects that plant size and overtime usage exert on
economic performance, hence the need to control for their effects. A
number of other unmeasured plant characteristics also may affect the
economic performance of each plant. To the extent that these unmeasured
factors are randomly distributed across these plants they do not bias the
coefficients obtained in our analysis. However, to the extent that there
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unmeasured factors are correlated with a measured variable, the
coefficients will be affected. Thus, in some of the analyses dummy
variables are included to capture the unique plant specific unmeasured
variables that may otherwise bias our results.5
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of these regressions. When product
quality is the dependent variable, the percentage of hourly employees
involved in QWL has a positive impact on quality in all of the
regressions and a statistically significant impact in three of the four
regressions. The coefficient of .01 on the QWL hourly involved variable
in the fourth column of Table 5 implies that an increase of 50% in the
percentage of hourly workers involved in QWL activities in a plant leads
to a 5 unit increase in the plant's quality index which amounts to .71 of
the standard deviation of the quality index over the whole sample. When
direct labor efficiency is the dependent variable, the negative
coefficient on the percent QWL involved variable implies that greater QWL
involvement is associated with lower efficiency, however, the coefficient
is not statistically significant.
Both the grievance and absentee rate variables in these regressions
often have significant independent impacts in the expected direction.
With respect to the quality regression, the negative coefficient on the
grievance rate variable implies that higher grievance rates are
associated with lower quality. The positive association between product
quality and absentee rates is surprising, but may be explained by the
upward time trend that exists in both quality and absentee rates
throughout the company.6 When direct labor efficiency is the dependent
variable, both higher grievance and absentee rates are associated with
lower efficiency. In two of the four cases this association is
statistically significant.
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In the quality and direct labor efficiency regressions the other
control variables frequently have statistically significant effects.
Except in a few of the regressions, both the use of more overtime and
larger plant size are associated with lower direct labor efficiency and
product quality. As well, the plant dummy variables as a group
consistently are statistically significant.
The regression technique provides a mechanism to isolate the
independent impacts of the QWL programs after controlling for the
influence of other factors. The regression technique, however, does have
a number of limitations. For one thing, the specification we utilize
focuses on the impacts that QWL involvement in a given year exerts on
economic performance in that year. This may ignore the cummulative and
dynamic impacts of the QWL programs. Secondly, the percentage of hourly
workers involved in QWL programs may be a poor measure of either the
intensity or quality of the QWL programs underway in a plant. This is
particularly troublesome if the true QWL effort is correlated with one of
the control variables included in the regression. In this case it may
well be that the control variables strip the QWL variable of its
effects. For example, in the case of a plant that persistently has a
high QWL effort, the impacts of the QWL programs may be inaccurately
picked up by the plant dummy variable or by the plant's low grievance
rate.
In the face of these problems we conclude that the regression
technique is a useful supplement to our analysis, but should not be
relied on exclusively to test for the impacts of the QWL programs. For
that reason, we also put value in the before and after 1977 comparisons
of the high QWL plants with the rest of the company and in the individual
plant histories reported earlier.
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III
Discussion
Utilizing a wide range of indicators of industrial relations and
economic performance, we find substantial diversity across the plants in
this company, even in the face of many common institutional and
background factors across the plants. The extent of this diversity
supports our claim that the collection of comparable longitudinal plant
level data can be a valuable tool for industrial relations practitioners.
Correlations between the various industrial relations performance
measures support our hypotheses regarding the inter-connected nature of
the industrial relations system. We find evidence that conflict carries
over from the grievance function, to local bargaining, and into strike
threats and strike occurrence. We also find evidence that individual
attitudes and behavior (as measured by absentee rates and participation
in suggestion programs) are strongly related to measures of plant level
conflict intensity.
We find strong evidence of an association between measures of
industrial relations and economic performance, where the latter is
measured by direct labor efficiency, product quality, and sickness and
accident rates and costs. This evidence is provided in both the
correlation and regression analyses. Here, we find support for our view
that it is useful to distinguish a conflict and an individual behavior
channel in the association between industrial relations and economic
performance. The presence of this association provides further testimony
of the value of this sort of cross sectional and longitudinal plant level
data.
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With the longitudinal plant level data we are able to assess the QWL
efforts underway in this company. The data reveal a slow and limited
diffusion of QWL involvement among hourly workers in this company. We
hypothesize that QWL efforts can affect organizational performance
through three channels--through conflict management, employee motivation
and work rule flexibility. With our data we could directly test only the
first two of these channels. Analysis of the effects of work rules on
organizational performance remains an important objective for future
research.
The evidence from our QWL assessment is inconsistent. Regression
analysis shows a strong positive impact of QWL involvement on product
quality but no impact on direct labor efficiency. Individual
longitudinal plant plots consistently show improvements in industrial
relations and economic performance coincident with the development of
hourly workforce involvement in QWL activities. However, the high QWL
hourly involvement plants as a group compared to the rest of the company
show no relative improvements in performance over the 1977 to 1980 period.
This suggests that QWL may well have varied impacts across plants.
The inconsistent findings also point to the need to extend our analysis
to later periods and other plants, and to search for more precise
measures of QWL program activity.
By exascerbating the tensions associated with mixed-motive
bargaining, the current economic slump poses difficult challenges for the
QWL programs underway in this company and elsewhere in the U.S. Further
empirical research is therefore needed to test the staying power of the
QWL programs and their impacts. Further theoretical work also is needed
to clarify the causal interaction between industrial relations system
properties, and organizational and worker goals. In this process much
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could be gained from enhanced interaction between practitioners who are
striving to sustain QWL programs and industrial relations researchers
engaged in the evaluation of QWL efforts.
The results of this research reinforce our belief in the value of
integrating theory and methods from organizational behavior, industrial
relations, and micro-economics. Organizational changes that focus on the
relationships among workers, unions, and employers must be well grounded
in understanding of the structural and procedural aspects of collective
bargaining, and must be assessed with consideration of their ability to
survive over time through changes in economic conditions. The growing
recognition of the importance of organizational changes should lead to
continued growth in research that focuses on the intersection of markets,
organizations, and industrial relations practices.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The weakness of the correlations with the strike occurence measure may
be due to the fact that 18 of the 30 strikes which occur in the data
happended in one year and were associated with the negotiation of a new
company-wide contract.
2. The average annual hourly workforce in the company dropped 20% from a
peak of 29,966 in 1978 to 23,877 in 1980.
3. For evidence that direct labor efficiency, product quality, grievance
and absentee rates are strongly affected by overtime usage and the
business cycle in these plants see our discussion on page 22. Similar
evidence from a different data set is provided in Katz, Kochan and
Gobeille (in press).
4. This before and after 1977 comparison differs somewhat from that
presented in Katz, Kochan and Gobeille, in press, Table 4. Here, we
provide a more conservative test of QWL impacts and compare high QWL
plants to the rest of the company. If the form of the earlier paper is
followed and changes in the performance of the six highest QWL plants is
compared to changes in the performance of the six lowest QWL plants, the
six high QWL plants show significant relative improvements in industrial
relations and economic performance from 1977 to 1980.
5. This procedure is equivalent to what is referred to in the
econometrics literature as a "fixed effects" regression.
6. The effects of an upward time trend in both quality and absentee rates
can be removed by looking at cross plant data in a given year. For each
of the years 1975, 1978 and 1980, across plants we find correlations
between absentee rates and product quality of -.13, -.29, and -.12,
respectively. None of these correlations, however, are statistically
significant at even the .10 level.
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Table 1
Mean, Minimum, and Maximum Values of
Industrial Relations, Economic,
and QWL Involvement Variables, 1980
Variable
Grievance
Absentee
Discipline
Demands /
Negtime-
Strikelet
Totstrike
Attitude
Sugperem
Sugpct
Direct
Quality
SAcost
SArate
SAtime
WCcost
% Salary QWL In-
volvement
% Hourly QWL In-
volvement
Mean
45.9
6.3
.180
283.4
24.1
.04
0
54.4
0.38
17.8
-2.32
129.3
$75.9
2.81
2.76
$138.4
76.6
15.7
--/ This data is for 1979, there were no negotiations in 1980.
Minimum
Value
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4.6
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0.13
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-23.7
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$49.0
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0
$21.0
0
0
Maximum
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1
0
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8
5313.0
100
72.4
Standard
Deviation
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Table 4
A Comparison of the Changes in IR ano Economic Performance
of the Six high QWL hourly Involvement Plants with the
Rest of the Company Before ano After 177
1974 - 1977
Six High
QWL Plants
Rest of the
Company
1977 - 1980
Six High
QWL Plants
Rest of the
Company
Mean Plant
Percentage
Change in:
Grievance Rate
Absentee Rate
Qualityl/
Direct
1/ Quality index figures are not available before 1975.
-9.7 -8.3
9.8
-27.0
-5.7
-30.0
-22.0
14. k
6.7
3.2 2.9
-3.3
III
Table 5
Regression Analysis of the Impact of Backgrouno,
Industrial Relations, ano hourly QWL Involvement Variables
on Proouct Quality
Explanatory
Variables
Intercept
Overtime
Work Force Size
QWL InvHourly
Grievance
Absentee
Quality
130.72**
(47.97)
-25.14*
( 2.12)
-. 002**
( 2.85)
.006*
(2.23)
-.003
( 1.58)
.07
(1.68)
Quality
133.35**
(67.75)
-30. 21**
( 2.65)
-. 002**
(3.14)
.007**
(2.60)
Dummies
R2
F
n
.241
8.21
135
.217
12.08
135
Quality
111.88**
(38.76)
5.79
(.60)
.001
(1.26)
.008
(1.62)
-.004
(1.64)
.158**
(4.34)
includeoa
.757
12.91
135
t - statistics are in parentheses
* = Statistically significant at .05 level
** = Statistically significant at .01 level
/ As a group the dummy variables are statistically significant at the
.01 level.
Quality
116.23**
(48.11)
-7.07*
( .727)
.003**
(3.03)
.01 0**
(2.78)
included1
.713
11.38
135
;, __ _
Table 6
Regression Analysis of the Impact of Background,
Industrial Relations, and Hourly QWL Involvement Variables
on Direct Labor Efficiency
Explanatory
Variables Direct Direct Direct
Intercept
Overtime
Work Force Size
QWL InvHourly
Grievance
Absentee
Dummies
R2
n
163.18**
(5.78)
-17.53
( 1.36)
-. 02**
( 2.94)
-.04
( 1.26)
-. 08**
( 3.41)
-.84
( 1.73)
.206
9.23
184
91.43**
(5.23)
-14.99
( 1.22)
-.03**
( 4.94)
-.03
( .98)
.121
8.25
184
242.81**
(6.21)
-17.58*
( 2.25)
-.009
( .90)
-.005
(.10)
-.002
( .11)
-1.47*
(3.62)
included1
.768
19.10
184
164.57**
(5.56)
-16.72*
( 2.07)
-.02*
( 2.33)
-.05
( .99)
includedl
.748
18.76
184
x - statistics are in parentheses
* = Statistically significant at .05 level
** = Statistically significant at .01 level
- As a group the dummy variables are statistically
significant at the .01 level.
Direct
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